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COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF CORPORATION TO ACTUAL
OWNER OF SHARES FOR DIVIDEND PAYMENT TO
APPARENT RECORD OWNER
Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302,
283 P.2d 605 (1955)
In 1931, X, a shareholder of record of defendant corporation, as-
signed his share certificates to plaintiff. Neither party notified de-
fendant of the transfer, hence no change of ownership was recorded
on the corporate books. Between 1931 and 1951, when plaintiff dis-
posed of the shares, dividends were declared by defendant but were not
paid either to plaintiff or the record owner. In 1949, Y, claiming that
he became owner of the shares through purchase of the assets of an
insolvent brokerage firm,' and that the certificates had been lost,
applied to the defendant for the issuance of new certificates. On Y's
presentation, in accordance with the corporate by-laws,2 of an affida-
vit and an indemnity bond to protect the corporation in case the origi-
nal certificates were still outstanding, together with an assignment of
interest from the administratrix of X's estate, defendant recorded Y
as the owner of the shares, issued him new certificates, and paid him
the accrued dividends. When notified that plaintiff possessed the
original certificates, defendant, while admitting a duty to recognize
the validity of such certificates, resisted plaintiff's claim to the accrued
dividends. The Supreme Court of Utah, analogizing the transaction
to cases involving forged or stolen certificates, held that the corpora-
tion was not justified in paying dividends to its apparent record
owner, and that plaintiff was entitled to the dividends.'
1. Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302,
283 P.2d 605 (1955).
2. Section 5 of the corporate by-laws provided:
Any person claiming that a certificate of stock is lost or destroyed shall
make an affidavit or affirmation of that fact and advertise the same in such
manner as the board of directors may require, and shall, if the board ofdirectors so requires, give the corporation a bond of indemnity, in form and
with one or more sureties satisfactory to the board, in at least double the
value of the stock represented by said certificate, whereupon a new certificate
may be issued of the same tenor and for the same number of shares as the
one alleged to be lost or destroyed, but always subject to the approval of the
board of directors.
Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302, 283
P.2d 605 (1955). Compare the above provision with UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER
AcT § 17.
3. Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302, 283 P.2d 605 (1955), re-
isring 2 Utah 2d 74, 269 P.2d 847 (1954).
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The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, effective in forty-seven states,
was promulgated for the specific purpose of giving to stock certifi-
cates some of the attributes of negotiability normally attaching to
bills and notes.5 Under its provisions, passage of "title" is accom-
plished by a physical delivery of the certificate either endorsed in
blank or accompanied by a separate document containing a written
assignment.6 Because a corporation may not be notified of a transfer
accomplished by either of the above methods, a transferor may be the
record owner of stock even though he has previously disposed of the
certificates and is not the actual owner of the shares. To meet the
commercial necessities of such a situation, and to give the corporation
a measure of protection in dealing with its stockholders, Section 3 of
the Act provides that a corporation is justified in paying dividends
to the record owner of the shares."
In the principal case the defendant corporation contended that,
after recording Y on the corporate books as the owner of the shares,
the payment of the accrued dividends to Y was justified since he was
the "record owner" as that term is used in Section 3 of the Act.
8
Obviously, however, Section 3 does not protect the corporation's pay-
ment of dividends to the record owner in all situations. For example,
a corporation is clearly not protected in paying dividends to its record
owner after receiving notice of an assignment of the shares," nor in
paying dividends to a person who becomes record owner as a result
of forging the endorsement on the certificates. 10 Similarly, it would
seem that a payment of dividends to a person who becomes "record
owner" by misrepresentation of his ownership and loss of the share
certificates should not be considered as a payment to the "record
4. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Act. The statutes in the various
states, and the date of their enactment, are listed in UNIFORM STOcK TRANSFER
ACT 6 (Cure. Supp. 1954). Pennsylvania has adopted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE.
5. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 1 (Commissioners' Note):
The transfer of the certificate is here made to operate as a transfer of
the shares.... The reason for the change is in order that the certificate may,
to the fullest extent possible, be the representative of the shares. This is the
fundamental purpose of the whole act, and is in accordance with the mer-
cantile usage. The transfer on the books of the corporation becomes thus like
the record of a deed of real estate under a registry system.
6. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 1.
7. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 3:
Nothing in this act shall be construed as forbidding a corporation (a) To
recognize the exclusive right of a person registered on its books as the owner
of shares to receive dividends, and to vote as such owner....
8. Brief for Appellant, p. 8, Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302,
283 P.2d 605 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Homestake Oil Co. v. Rigler, 39 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1930); Baar v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 302 Ky. 91, 193 S W.2d 1011 (1946); Central
Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Wilder, 32 Neb. 454, 49 N.W. 369 (1891); Turnbull v.
Longacre Bank, 249 N.Y. 159, 163 N.E. 135 (1928); Steel v. Island Milling Co.,
47 Ore. 293, 83 Pac. 783 (1906).
10. Herbert Kraft Co. Bank v. Bank of Orland, 133 Cal. 64, 65 Pac. 143 (1901);
Pratt v. Taunton Copper Co., 123 Mass. 110 (1877).
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owner" as provided in Section 3 of the Act. Thus, the ultimate de-
cision in the case should not be based on the provisions of this section.
The court in the instant case predicated the corporation's liability
for the accrued dividends on two bases: (1) that since plaintiff had
"title" to the shares, Y could receive nothing through the purported
"assignment"" from the administratrix of X, the original record
owner, and thus Y's position was equivalent to that of a forger or a
thief ;12 and (2) that the corporation was "not free from negligence'"
in making payment to Y, since it could have protected itself merely
by paying the dividends to the original record owner or his estate."
Neither ground appears to be an adequate foundation for the de-
cision. While Y's position might be roughly analogous to that of
a forger or thief in not having "title" to the shares, the whole con-:
text of the Act, especially Section 3, indicates that the location of
"title" is not determinative of the corporation's right to pay divi-
dends."4 Equally unsubstantial is the court's suggestion that the cor-
poration could have protected itself merely by making payment of
the dividends to the original record owner or his estate. If Y's repre-
sentations to the corporation had been true, the corporation would
have been placed on notice of an assignment and would not have been
protected in subsequently paying dividends to the original record
owner or his estate. 15 Since the corporation could not ascertain .the
truth of Y's representations until plaintiff's claim was made-the
original record owner being dead and his administratrix having relin-
quished any claim to the shares-it seems clearly inaccurate to char-
acterize the corporation's conduct as negligent.
The most adequate solution of the problem posed by the unique
factual situation in the instant case can be found by examining the
procedure governing replacement of lost or stolen certificates. Under
Section 17 of the Act, which is basically a codification of the common
law,'6 and under the provisions of most corporate by-laws, 17 the cor:-
11. It would seem that the action of X's administratrix was merely a relin-
quishment of interest, rather than an "assignment." Actually, Y claimed that the
original record owner, X, had assigned the shares to the brokerage firm through
which Y claimed ownership of the shares. See Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Lindner
v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302, 283 P.2d 605 (1955).
12. Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302, 283 P.2d 605 (1955).
13. Ibid. The court reached this conclusion by strictly construing the statute
as protecting the corporation only if payment was made to the record owner or
his estate. Thus, the court reasoned that payment of dividends to anyone other
than the record owner or his estate was negligent.
14. See the text of § 3 quoted in note 7 supra.
15. See text supported by note 9 supra.
16. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 17 (Commissioners' Note). . .
17. CHRISTY & MCLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK § 275 (2d ed. 1940). The
corporation in the instant case issued the certificates voluntarily in accordance
with its by-laws, cited in note 2 supra; thus § 17, dealing only with court-ordered
issuance of certificates, was not applicable. The by-law provision of the de-
fendant corporation however, contained basically the same procedure in regard
to the furnishing of an affidavit and an indemnity bond as § 17 of the Act. No
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
poration is not required to replace lost certificates unless the applicant
furnishes-an indemnity bond.sufficient to protect the corporation from
any liability incurred by reason of the fact that the original certifi-
cate remains outstanding. The courts which have considered the effect
of an indemnity bond provision have readily concluded that the pres-
ence or absence of such bond does not* in any way alter the corpora-
tion's liability.28 Such a conclusion, however, is open to criticism.
Admittedly, a court's decision should not be based on the existence
or non-existence of an indemnity bond in an individual case. However,
the availability of such a protective measure for the corporation in
every situation involving a claim of a lost certificate should be deter-
minative of liability when, as in the instant case, neither party, real-
istically, is at fault.19 Ultimately, of course, the risk of loss will be,
not on the corporation, but on the surety.20 Since the surety can con-
dition its issuance of the indemnity bond on satisfactory proof by the
claimant of the actual loss of the certificates, the ultimate responsi-
bility for the surety's mistaken judgment should be its own.
Certainly the actual owner of shares is entitled to benefit from the
procedure established for the replacement of lost or stolen certifi-
cates . 2 1 Only in such a way will the desired objective, negotiability of
share certificates, be achieved without undue interference with the
interests of shareholders and the corporation. The quarrel, then, is
not with the result reached in the principal case, but with the reason-
ing used to reach that result.
cases were found in which a court distinguished the corporation's liability for
a wrongful dividend payment in situations involving a voluntary replacement of
the lost certificates from the liability imposed when the replacement was court-
ordered.
18. Cleveland & Mahoning R.R. v. Bobbins, 35 Ohio St. 483 (1880); First
Nat'l Bank v. Stribling, 16 Okla. 41, 86 Pac. 512 (1905).
19. As to the corporation's standard of care, see text supported by note 15
supra. Plaintiff's failure to notify defendant of the assignment of the shares from
the original record owner to herself for nearly twenty years was not negligent
conduct. Cleveland & Mahoning R.R. v. Robbins, 35 Ohio St. 483 (1880). The
corporation did not raise this issue in the instant case.
20. In the instant case the indemnity bond was in the amount of $25,000. The
market value of the shares was $11,000 and the suit was for $4.000 in dividends.
Thus the indemnity bond clearly covered the entire liability of the corporation.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 1, 3, 4, Lindner v. Utah Southern Oil Co., 3 Utah 2d 302
283 P.2d 605 (1955). In at least one case it has been held that the bond should
be of the open penalty type. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
360 Mo 877, 231 S.W.2d 165 (1950).
21. Two early cases relied on by defendant are not precisely in point. In Clove-
land & Mahoning R.R. v. Bobbins, 35 Ohio St. 483 (1880), the corporation issued
new certificates and paid dividends to the oiqinal record owner. In Brisbane v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 94 N.Y. 204 (1884), the corporation
issued the certificates and paid dividends to the administrator of the original
record owner on his representation that the original certificates were lost. In
spite of the factual distinction, however, the result in the instant case appears to
be basically in conflict with the earlier decisions.
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